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ABSTRACT 
Several successful terrorist attacks have occurred on train and subway systems 
around the world, and past attempts have been made to attack the New York City Subway 
System. It is clear that the train and subway systems within the United States remain a 
highly probable target of terrorist groups. Most systems are too porous and vast to protect 
every entrance and exit; even if this were possible, the physical screening of every 
passenger is just not feasible due to the volume of the passengers and fluid nature of the 
systems.  
This thesis recommends applying a CompStat Counterterrorism strategy to this 
threat. It applies those same techniques that were successful in reducing crime in New 
York, as well as many other major cities, and adjusts them to counteract the threat of a 
terrorist attack on train and subway systems across the nation. This strategy takes a 
proven, realistic, and sustainable approach to the current threat, while allowing the 
systems to operate normally. This thesis does not portend to ensure absolute security, but 
applies the same successful crime-reducing strategy to the current threat of a terrorist 
attacks on train and subway systems. 
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A. BACKGROUND   
Several successful terrorist attacks have been targeted at train and subway 
systems around the world. In addition, past attempts have been made to attack the New 
York City subway system. It is clear that the train and subway systems within the United 
States remain a highly probable target of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and their 
affiliated groups. Transportation security experts have noted, in the wake of the July 2005 
attacks on the London transit system and Madrid bombings of March 2004, it is clear that 
Al Qaeda regards mass transit as a primary target.1     
Numerous homeland security experts, such as the RAND Corporation, agree that 
the train and subway systems are highly likely targets of international terrorists: 
Recent attacks on passenger-rail systems around the world highlight the 
vulnerability of rail travel and the importance of rail security for these 
passengers. Even though there have been no successful attacks on rail 
systems in the United States recently, the FBI and local police departments 
have thwarted several planned attacks against the New York subway 
system alone. The use of passenger rail and the frequency with which 
terrorists target it call for a commitment to analyzing and improving rail 
security in the United States.2 
Not only do analytical institutions believe the train and subway systems are 
targets, but also current homeland security leaders such as Dr. Richard Falkenrath, the 
Deputy Commissioner of Counterterrorism for the New York City Police Department: 
The most likely scenario, I believe, is an attack in the subway system with 
multiple, near-simultaneous satchel bombs. 3  
                                                 
1 Charles Sahm, Hard Won Lessons: Transit Security, Safe Cities Project, March 2006, 3.  
2 Jeremy M. Wilson, Brian A. Jackson, Mel Eisman, Paul Steinberg, K. Jack Riley, “Securing 
America’s Passenger-Rail Systems,” RAND Corporation, December 7, 2007,  
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG705.pdf [accessed February 10, 2008]. 
3 Dr. Richard A. Falkenrath, Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism, NYPD, Testimony before 
the Committee on Homeland Security, United States House of Representatives, March 6, 2007. 
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The Transportation Security Administration’s Office of Intelligence reported in 
their February 29, 2008 Mass Transit System Threat Assessment that extremists remain 
intent on targeting the United States homeland and the volume of previous attacks and 
plots against the mass transit system demonstrates continued strong interest in targeting 
this sector. They also report that previous rail attacks could inspire terrorists to conduct 
similar attacks in the United States.4 
Terrorists have already successfully targeted mass transportation systems around 
the world. The most prolific attacks have occurred in Madrid, London and Mumbai. In 
each of these attacks, multiple devices exploded at multiple locations. 
On March 11, 2004, ten separate explosions went off on four commuter trains in 
Madrid, Spain. The attacks occurred between 7:39 a.m. and 7:54 a.m., killing 190 people 
and injuring over 1,400.5  
On July 7, 2005, four separate explosions rocked London’s underground train 
system and double-decker bus system. Three bombs exploded within fifty seconds of 
each other at 8:50 a.m., and the final blast occurred at 9:47 a.m. on a double decker bus. 
Fifty-two passengers were killed and over 700 injured. The four Muslim suicide bombers 
that perpetrated this attack were also killed, and it is believed that they were affiliated 
with Al Qaeda.6 
Again on July 11, 2006, seven bombs exploded on the suburban rail system in 
Mumbai, India, killing 209 and injuring over 700. The blasts exploded over an eleven-
minute timeframe and detonated between 6:24 p.m. and 6:35 p.m.. Reports indicated that 
these bombs were placed in the overhead luggage compartments and were not the work 
of suicide bombers. 7   
                                                 
4 Jim Popkin, “Government warns of terror threat to trains,” Deep Background NBC News 
Investigates, March 4, 2008. http://deepbackground.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2008/03/04/729103.aspx 
[accessed February 21, 2008].  
5 CNN website, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2004/madrid.bombing/index.html [accessed January 
20, 2006].  
6 CNN website, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2005/london.bombing/ [accessed November 20, 
2006]. 
7 CNN website, http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2006/mumbai.bombing/ [accessed November 20, 
2006]. 
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Although terrorism on train and subway systems is a worldwide problem, 
practical constraints to focus on homeland security have led the author to tailor this thesis 
to train and subway systems in the United States. In particular, the main focus of this 
thesis will be on the New York City train and subway system, the largest metropolitan 
subway system in the United States; if it can be adequately protected, then the theory 
contained in this thesis could apply across the entire country’s train and subway systems.  
The author is focusing on the New York City Subway System precisely because 
international terrorists are targeting it. Several plots have been uncovered within New 
York City: 
  
• New York City, New York – July 31, 1997 
On July 31, 1997, New York City police officers successfully averted a potential 
nail-filled pipe bomb attack by two Palestinian immigrants on a Brooklyn subway 
station frequented by Orthodox Jews - Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer and Lafi Khalil. 
 
  • New York City, New York – 2003 
Ron Suskind, in his new book, The One Percent Doctrine, Deep Inside America’s 
Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11, reports that Al-Qaeda planned to release 
hydrogen cyanide in the New York subways in 2003. Forty-five days before the 
attacks, Ayman al-Zawahir, Osama bin-Laden’s number two man, called off the 
attacks. 
 
• New York City, New York – August 27, 2004 
On August 27, 2004, the eve of the Republican National Convention, Shahawar 
Matin Siraj and his co-conspirator James Elshafay were arrested for planning to 
attack the Herald Square subway station in New York City with bombs hidden in 
backpacks. 8 
 
                                                 
8 Democratic Staff of the Committee on Homeland Security, “Detour Ahead Critical Vulnerabilities in 
America’s Rail and Mass Transit Security Programs,” Congressional Report prepared by the Democratic 
Staff of the Committee on Homeland Security, 7. 
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Research has clearly exposed that the train and subway systems, particularly in 
New York City, are a target of International terrorists, such as Al Qaeda and other 
affiliated groups. Protecting the train and subway systems in New York and across the 
United States is a daunting and incredibly difficult task, as stated in the 9/11 Commission 
Report:  
Surface transportation systems such as railroads and mass transit remain 
hard to protect because they are so accessible and extensive9  
The size of New York City’s and the country’s train and subway system’s 
physical infrastructure and the incredible volume of passengers, as well as the fluid 
nature of the system, make it extremely difficult to fully protect.  
For example, the New York City subway system has 468 stations and 660 miles 
of track, as well as hundreds of emergency exits and outside, elevated tracks.10 
Additionally, for a national perspective, Amtrak operates a nationwide system in forty-six 
states and has 21,000 miles of routes.11  
The number of passengers who traverse the systems each day is millions more 
than commercial air travel. In New York City alone, over five million people a day use 
the subway system, adding up to a yearly total of 1.5 billion in 2006.12 As reported in a 
RAND transportation study, as many people traverse New York City’s Penn Station in a 
single weekday morning as travel through Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport in 
about two and a half days.13 
The fluid nature of the train and subway systems prevents passengers from being 
subject to extensive and prolonged security procedures. Unlike commercial airline 
                                                 
9 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 9/11 Commission Report, 391.  
10  Metropolitan Transportation Authority website, http://www.mta.info/nyct/facts/ffsubway.htm 
[accessed November 15, 2006].  
11 Amtrak website, 
http://www.amtrak.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=Amtrak/am2Copy/Title_Image_Copy_Page&c=
am2Copy&cid=1081442674300&ssid=542 [accessed February 10, 2008]   
12 NYPIRIG Straphangers Campaign, 
http://www.straphangers.org/diaries/ubbthreads.php/ubb/showflat/Number/406556/page/1 [accessed 
February 10, 2008]. 
13 Wilson et al., “Securing America’s Passenger-Rail Systems.” 
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passengers who are subjected to lengthy security screenings, the rapid tempo of the 
passenger rail system makes this impractical. Transit Security experts have reported:  
Protecting mass transit from terrorism is an even more challenging task 
than protecting the nation’s air traffic network. Unlike an airplane, a bus, 
subway, or commuter train is in a constant state of flux, with passengers 
boarding and departing from numerous entry and exit points; and transit 
facilities rely on open architecture and the rapid and easy movement of 
patrons. In addition, the sheer volume of riders also makes it impractical to 
subject users of mass transit to the same intensive screening that airline 
passengers undergo.14 
It is painfully obvious that any strategy to protect the country’s rail and subway 
systems must be complex and malleable. Even New York City, commonly recognized as 
a leader in homeland security initiatives, has no comprehensive, written strategy to 
address the threat of terrorism on the New York City Subway System. Instead, a series of 
programs and initiatives has developed over time, in an ad hoc manner. A 
comprehensive, written strategy is needed to ensure that everything realistically possible 
is being done to protect this portion of the transportation system, which has repeatedly 
been identified as being under threat. This strategic-level research should then be used as 
a model for the development of plans for other large metropolitan cities across the nation. 
Terrorism is a complex problem. It is often a political or religious concept about 
using power and violence to influence change.15 Violent crime, such as homicide and 
rape, is also a complex problem that is not usually caused by a single difficulty; 
frequently, it is caused by several societal factors such as poverty, family structure and 
the environment.16 They both consist of using power and violence to achieve the outcome 
they desire. For example, a suicide bomber who walks into a crowd and detonates himself 
is, in fact, killing those victims around him. Although this action would be described as 
terrorism, it is also a crime of murder. Homeland Security experts such as Dr. Kathleen 
Kiernan have stated:  
                                                 
14 Sahm, Hard Won Lessons,” 3. 
15 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press, 2006, 2. 
16 “The Root Causes of Crime,” CS&CPC Statement on the Root Causes of Crime, 1996, 2. 
http://www.preventingcrime.net/library/Causes_of_Crime.pdf [accessed February 21, 2008].  
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Not all criminals are terrorists, but all terrorists are, in fact, criminals17 
Other authors concur and relate terrorism to crime, such as Jean O’Neil: 
First and foremost, terrorism is a crime;  it violates the law as much as any 
robbery or burglary or homicide. This fact helps make it amenable to the 
basic concepts of crime prevention.18 
A clear terrorism-crime nexus can be exploited in the effort to combat terrorism. 
One of the leaders of the Madrid train attack, Jamal Ahmidan, was a common criminal, 
who was arrested for murder and drug dealing well before he became a terrorist.19 In fact, 
he was able to use his criminal network connections to obtain the dynamite used in the 
attack.20  
For years, Law Enforcement has effectively combated crime; therefore, some of 
the most successful crime-fighting strategies should be applied to fighting terrorism. 
Counterterrorism experts agree with this philosophy and have stated: Fighting terrorism 
effectively is more like police work than military combat21 
The system the NYPD uses to combat crime is a complex one, commonly referred 
to as CompStat, or Computerized Statistics.22 This crime-fighting strategy has helped to 
reduce crime to record levels and has made New York the safest large city in America.23  
                                                 
17 Kathleen Kiernan, “Tradecraft or Streetcraft?” Crime and Justice International 22, no. 93, 
July/August 2006, 29.   
18 Jean F. O’Neil, “Crime Prevention can Spur and Support Homeland Security in Neighborhoods and 
Communities,” Topics in Crime Prevention, National Crime Prevention Council, Winter 2006, 1. 
http://www.ncpc.org/cms/cms-upload/ncpc/File/topics_cp_hs.pdf  [accessed February 21, 2008] 
19 Andrea Elliot, “Where Boys Grow Up to Be Jihadis,” New York Times Magazine, November 25, 
2007 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/25/magazine/25tetouan-t.html?pagewanted=4&_r=1 [accessed 
March 7, 2008. 
20 Justin Webster, “The Madrid Connection,” Documentary Film, October 2007 [viewed March 3, 
2008]. 
21 Clark McCauley, “War Versus Justice in Response to Terrorist Attacks,” Psychology of Terrorism, 
Oxford, 2007, 61. 
22 Tom Steinert-Threlkeld, “CompStat: From Humble Beginnings,” September 9, 2002 
http://www.baselinemag.com/c/a/Past-News/CompStat-From-Humble-Beginnings/ [accessed February 17, 
2008]. 
23 Al Baker, “City is Doubling Police Program to Prevent Crime,” New York Times, December 27, 
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/27/nyregion/27crime.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1 [accessed 
February 21, 2008]. 
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In New York City, the NYPD’s CompStat process revolutionized police work and 
reduced crime dramatically. CompStat originated in 1994 under the leadership of then 
NYC Police Commissioner William Bratton and his Deputy Commissioner of 
Operations, Jack Maple. While computerized statistics were used to measure crime, the 
main idea was a multi-layered strategy to reduce crime and then to hold the precinct 
commanders accountable for the crime in their area of responsibility. The CompStat 
strategy used to combat crime in New York City consists of four components: 
intelligence, detection, effective deployment, and relentless follow-up. 
The main focus was on violent crimes, but they also concentrated on smaller 
crimes because they adhered to the theory that these quality-of-life issues contributed to 
larger, more serious crimes, commonly known as the “Broken Windows” theory.24 
Precinct commanders monitor the crime in their precincts by mapping out the 
time, place and type of crime so they know where and when to apply their resources. 
They have the responsibility to analyze who committed the crime, when it occurred, how 
it was committed and, most importantly, what can be done to stop it. 
By applying this strategy to the problem of terrorism, in particular to the potential 
for terrorist attacks against the nation’s train and subway system, this threat can be 
reduced to a manageable level. Heather MacDonald, who works for the Manhattan 
Institute, agrees and has written that “anti-terrorism efforts should be CompStated.”25  
The Compstat model has spread across the nation and has been successful in 
reducing crime in many large cities and towns.26 It is a conclusion that a comprehensive 
CompStat counterterrorism strategy to protect the train and subway systems will follow 
suit and spread across the country.    
                                                 
24 Dennis C. Smith and William J. Bratton, “Performance Management in New York City: Compstat 
and the Revolution in Police Management,” 459. https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/legis/nps03-011404-
12.pdf&code=875cea905b4c13a5e58d3e3b8daf57a1 [accessed February 20, 2008].  
25 Heather MacDonald, “Keeping New York Safe for Terrorists,” The City Journal, Autumn 2001,  
http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/HeatherMacDonald.htm [accessed March 5, 2008. 
26 Shaila K. Dewan, “New York’s Gospel of Policing by Data Spreads Across U.S.” New York Times, 
April 28, 2004 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9507E6D61E3AF93BA15757C0A9629C8B63 [accessed 
February 17, 2008]. 
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The first step in this strategy is to have a robust local intelligence system in place 
in order to adequately examine the threat that a municipality is facing. This local 
intelligence system cannot rely solely on federal resources to provide intelligence 
information; it must be innovative and collect information from sources all over the 
world to adequately examine the global threat it is facing. A municipality must also 
gather information locally to compensate for the homegrown threat. 
Secondly, there must be a system of detection in place to identify potential 
terrorists. Detection in police work comes from a variety of sources such as victims, 
witnesses and video cameras. All of these sources and more, such as the train employees 
and passengers, must be leveraged when dealing with the possibility of terrorist attacks 
on the train and subway systems.  
Additionally, there should be an aspect of deterring terrorism and apprehending 
terror suspects through effective deployment of available resources. Effective deployment 
of resources creates omnipresence in police work and can be adjusted to deal with the 
threat of terrorism. This can be a deterrent factor but can also be a means of apprehending 
suspects before or during an event. 
Relentless follow-up is necessary to apprehend those responsible and to prevent 
future crimes. This same tactic can and must be applied to terrorism. It is not practical to 
think that all terrorist attacks can be prevented, but, once committed, those responsible 
must be apprehended before they can strike again. Research in this thesis has shown that 
relentless follow-up may have prevented additional attacks. 
Finally, all of these aspects must work in conjunction with each other to reduce 
the possibility of an attack on a transportation system. Even then, unfortunately, there are 
no guarantees or absolutes in the age of terrorism. Therefore, any strategy to protect a 
train or subway system must include an effective evacuation plan in an effort to aid in the 
recovery from an attack. This is essential in preventing the terrorists from accomplishing 
their goals of causing carnage and fear.  
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Just as in the crime-fighting version of CompStat, someone needs to be 
accountable for the implementation and maintenance of the strategy in place. A “Precinct 
Commander” type of figure needs to be in charge of reducing terrorism on the train or 
subway system.  
In the NYPD, the closest position is that of the Transit Bureau Counterterrorism 
Inspector. While this position is nominally charged with implanting the counterterrorism 
policies of the NYPD within the Transit Bureau, it is certainly not managed through the 
CompStat paradigm. Any successful Compstat strategy for reducing terrorism within the 
train and subway systems needs to have a central figure that has control of the resources 
involved and ensures that the strategy is being implemented properly.       
B. RELEVANT LITERATURE 
The relevant literature has been separated into categories to clearly identify the 
situation. Some documents focus on the general nature of the threat to train and subway 
systems. Others clearly identify the New York City Subway System as having been the 
target of past plots and attempts. Literature also points out the difficulty of protecting the 
train and subway systems. Additionally, documents describe the current New York City 
subway evacuation plan and discuss how to improve it.  
Transportation security experts have described the threat to the train and subway 
systems as follows: 
In the wake of the July 2005 bombing of the London transit system and 
Madrid bombings of March 2004, it is clear that al Qaeda regards mass 
transit as a primary target 27  
Extremists, however, remain intent on targeting the U.S. homeland. The 
volume of previous attacks and recent plotting against mass transit 
systems overseas demonstrates continued strong terrorist interest in 
targeting this sector. Previous rail attacks in Madrid (March 2004), 
                                                 
27 Sahm, Hard Won Lessons,” 3.  
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London (July 2005), and Mumbai (July 2006) could inspire terrorists to 
conduct similar attacks in the United States28  
The review of the literature focused on the New York City Subway System since 
it is the largest in the United States and has been targeted by terrorists. It was examined to 
find the vulnerabilities and to identify any possible improvements. “The New York City 
Transit Agency is the largest subway system in this country (64 percent of one-way trips, 
58 percent of passenger miles, and half of the passenger stations), with more than 6,000 
scheduled trains per day carrying over 3 million passengers.” 29 
Homeland security officials concur that the New York City Transit System is a 
target of terrorists, particularly since there have been at least three (3) documented 
incidents of terror plots. A congressional report prepared by the democratic staff of the 
Committee on Homeland Security reported: 
 
• In July, 1997, New York City police officers successfully averted an 
attack on a Brooklyn subway station by two Palestinian terrorists. 
• In 2003, Al-Qaeda planned to release hydrogen cyanide in the New 
York subways but, forty-five days before the attacks, Ayman al-
Zawahir, Osama bin-Laden’s number two man, called off the attacks. 
• In August 2004, on the eve of the Republican National Convention, 
two men, Shahawar Matin Siraj and his co-conspirator James Elshafay 
were arrested for planning to attack the Herald Square subway station 
with bombs hidden in backpacks.30 
                                                 
28 “Mass Transit System Threat Assessment 29 February 2008,” as reported by Jim Popkin, 
“Government warns of terror threat to trains,” Deep Background NBC News Investigates, March 4, 2008. 
http://deepbackground.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2008/03/04/729103.aspx. 
29 Characteristics and Common Vulnerabilities Infrastructure Category: Subways, Risk Management 
Division, Office of Infrastructure Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Version: November 
23, 2005, 2.  
30 Detour Ahead Critical Vulnerabilities in America’s Rail and Mass Transit Security Programs, 
Congressional Report prepared by the Democratic Staff of the Committee on Homeland Security, 7.  
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While there is consensus that the New York City Subway System is a target, there 
is some debate in the literature on the best way to protect the lives of the passengers. The 
director of the Center for Policing Terrorism at the Manhattan Institute has stated rail 
systems require a completely different approach to security from the one used in aviation: 
Rail moves a lot more people than air does. It’s designed to be an open 
system that can move a lot of people fast.31 
Protecting the mass transit system in the United States is a daunting and 
incredibly difficult task as stated in the 9/11 Commission Report:  
Surface transportation systems such as railroads and mass transit remain 
hard to protect because they are so accessible and extensive32  
Additionally, a Mineta Transportation Institute study of the United Kingdom’s 
response to the IRA’s campaign against their transportation system as well as the Tokyo 
Subway Sarin attack, concluded, “Indeed, no security measures can prevent terrorists 
from setting off bombs in public places.”33 
The New York City Police Department has implemented a series of programs 
aimed at protecting the city in general and some directed at the subway system in 
particular. 
The broadest program is the “International Liaison Program,” which assigns 
NYPD personnel overseas in a dozen different locations to gather intelligence and report 
directly back to the department, without any boundaries in between.34 While this has 
caused some consternation at the federal level with the Department of State and the  
 
 
                                                 
31 Associated Press, “Amtrak to unveil new security measures including random bag screening,” 
International Herald Tribune, February 18, 2008 http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=10163174 
[accessed February 18, 2008].  
32 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 9/11 Commission Report, 391.  
33 Brian Jenkins and Larry Gersten, “Protecting Public Surface Transportation Against Terrorism and 
Serious Crime: Continuing Research on Best Security Practices,” Mineta Transportation Institute, 
September 2001, 23.  
34 Sergeant Robert Ruggiero, NYPD Intelligence Division Personnel Officer, author interview, 
October 30, 2006.   
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Federal Bureau of Investigation, the NYPD has persevered, and these officers remain a 
valuable intelligence-gathering asset. New York City Police Commissioner Raymond 
Kelly has stated,  
We can’t rely solely on other agencies to protect us here. So there’s 
nothing like self help, and that’s what we’re doing.35  
Other deployment programs such as “Atlas Teams” and “Hercules Teams” 
involve having groups of officers — some heavily armed emergency service officers — 
as well as intelligence-division detectives, respond to high-profile locations randomly in 
order to disrupt any pre-operational surveillance or stop an actual attack. This is 
complemented by the “Critical Response Vehicle” surge drills in which patrol officers 
from all of the NYPD precincts, police service areas and transit districts respond to pre-
designated, high-profile locations, such as Times Square, stage a show of force, and then 
disperse to additional locations throughout the city to once again interrupt or deter an 
attack.36  
The most directly related program to the subway system is the “Random Bag 
Check” program in which NYPD officers respond to some of the 468 subway stations37 
that have been pre-selected; they randomly search passengers’ bags as they enter the 
system.  Some have stated that with these programs “The NYPD, with its extensive 
counterterrorism division that monitors foreign news services and actually has officers 
stationed overseas, is widely recognized as the gold standard in this regard.”38 
Others have disputed the effectiveness of some of the NYPD’s programs, such as 
James Metzger in his Naval Postgraduate School Thesis39 where he states,  
                                                 
35 Ed Bradley interview for “60 Minutes,” “Inside the NYPD’s Anti-Terror Fight,” 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/03/17/60minutes/main1416824.shtml [accessed February 18, 2008]. 
36 Deputy Chief Vincent Giordano, NYPD City Wide Counterterrorism Coordinator, author interview, 
November 20, 2007. 
37 Metropolitan Transportation Authority website.  
38 Sahm, Hard Won Lessons: Transit Security, 8.  
39 James Metzger, “Preventing Terrorist Bombings on United States Subway Systems,” September 
2006, Naval Postgraduate School Master’s Thesis. 
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The current method used by the New York City Police Department to 
randomly screen passengers on the New York Subway have not been 
proven effective.40  
Instead, Mr. Metzger advocates utilizing the Behavior Observation Screening 
System (BOSS), which analyzes a person’s behavior and documents, and then employs 
interview techniques to identify potential terrorists. While this system may work in the 
airline industry, and has “made El Al (Israeli Airline) the most secure in the world,”41, it 
is not practical in the busiest subway system in the country. The number of people who 
travel on one particular airline, El Al, is miniscule compared to the millions who travel 
the subway and train systems each day. As reported in a RAND study, “By comparison, 
as many people traverse New York’s Penn Station in a single morning as travel through 
Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport in about two and a half days.”42 
The BOSS system is a valuable tool that when appropriately applied in a layered 
strategy can be very useful in identifying inappropriate or suspicious behavior, but cannot 
be relied upon solely in an extremely fast-paced and fluid environment such as in a train 
or subway system.  
However the situation is viewed, the fact remains that the train and subway 
systems are a prime target for a terrorist attack, and are so porous that an attack is very 
difficult to prevent. Before going any further, it is important to explain why we should 
concentrate on a conventional attack on the subways more than any other threat. The 
RAND Passenger Rail Study reports, “Most of the threat to rail systems comes from 
bombings,” and: 
The prevalence of explosive devices in past terrorist operations suggests 
that such attack modes will feature prominently in future threats to these 
systems. Timed explosive devices can provide a way for a terrorist 
organization to stage attacks while preserving its human capital; suicide 
operations using similar technologies and components provide an 
                                                 
40 James Metzger, “Preventing Terrorist Bombings,” 19.  
41 Ibid., 23.  
42 Wilson et al., “Securing America’s Passenger-Rail Systems.”  
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alternative strategy for groups to increase the potential effectiveness of 
such attacks at the cost of their group members.43 
Some of the literature described the ways in which terrorist attacks were carried 
out. A 2005 Mineta Transportation Institute Case Study of Contemporary Terrorist 
Incidents reported, “Mostly, the perpetrators relied on some sort of delayed effect or 
timer so that the terrorists could escape.”44 This leaves valuable time in between potential 
explosions for passengers to escape. This precious time must be used wisely to evacuate 
the entire system as quickly as possible.    
The literature addressing the issues thus far has been peripheral in nature, but 
important for framing the central arguments of this thesis. To further build the case for 
my strategically positioned but operationally robust proposal for security on New York’s 
rails, we now turn to the essential documents of the NYPD responsible for outlining the 
current plans for security. It is important to note that there is no central authoritative 
document. Rather, a series of documents deal with individual issues related to protecting 
subway travel in New York. This failure to provide doctrinal oversight for the individual 
plans and procedures is important to note, and is an issue this thesis will address and 
correct.  
The evacuation plan is a one-page document that confirms the aforementioned 
evacuation plan for the NYC Subway System. It relies upon the civilian employees of the 
Metropolitan Transit Authority, the train conductors, and motormen to pull the train into 
the next available station and self evacuate the trains upon notification from the central 
MTA headquarters.45 It is unclear exactly how the MTA is notified, but, from the 
available literature and interviews of counterterrorism officials, it appears to be from the 
police department; whether it is from the NYPD Transit Police Department representative 
or from the Communications Unit (9/11 dispatcher) is unclear.  
                                                 
43 Wilson et al., “Securing America’s Passenger-Rail Systems,” 19.  
44 Brian Taylor, Robin Liggett and Ellen Cavangh, “Designing and Operating Safe and Secure Transit 
Systems: Assessing the Current Practices in the United States and Abroad,” Mineta Transportation 
Institute, 2005, 136.  
45 Metropolitan Transportation Authority Response to Rapid Transit Emergencies. P/I 10.32.3, 
Addendum, July 22, 2005.  
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Once the police department notifies the MTA of a confirmed explosion, they will 
transmit the evacuation order to their employees. The train conductors will then pull the 
train into the next station and evacuate the trains onto the platform. They are supposed to 
then take the train back to the train yard from which they started. No clear provision 
exists to evacuate the passengers from the platforms and stations, just off the trains.46 In a 
preparedness review of the MTA, a September 2003 Mineta Transportation Institute 
Report concluded, “Another concern for the MTA is the lack of a centralized and 
consistent emergency response plan for dealing with incidents at major stations.”47   
A problem with the current plan is how the evacuation will take place. The train 
conductors are supposed to evacuate the passengers from the train onto the platform, but 
that is where the current plan ends. The passengers must be totally evacuated from the 
subway system in order to be safe, so any plan should require them to be evacuated from 
the system and then directed to a secure place for medical evaluation, etc. Paul A. 
Erickson states this in his book, Emergency Response Planning for Corporate and 
Municipal Managers. He writes, “evacuated personnel must be managed effectively to  
ensure proper compliance with corporate post-evacuation procedures, including 
procedures regarding the control of personal vehicles, medical consultation and follow-
up.”48  
The literature has demonstrated that there is a substantial threat to the train and 
subway systems in New York, as well as around the country. It also shows the difficulty 
in how to adequately protect and evacuate the system.  
C. HYPOTHESIS 
New York City and the United States’ train and subway systems are currently at 
risk of a conventional improvised explosive attack from terrorists, like those that have 
occurred in other cities around the world. Most systems are too porous to protect every 
                                                 
46 Metropolitan Transportation Authority Response to Rapid Transit Emergencies. 
47 Brian Jenkins and Frances Edwards-Winslow, Saving City Lifelines: Lessons Learned in the 9-11 
Terrorist Attacks, Mineta Transportation Institute, September 2003, 43.  
48 Paul A. Erickson, Emergency Response Planning for Corporate and Municipal Managers, 
Academic Press, 1999, 72. 
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entrance and exit. Even if this were possible, the physical screening of every passenger is 
just not practical due to the volume of passengers. Other proposed screening techniques, 
such as relying solely on the aforementioned “BOSS” technique, are also impractical due 
to the volume. 
Through research of the past major terrorist attacks on train and subway systems, 
along with examination of the current policies and procedures plans in place, specifically 
in New York City, this thesis has formulated a strategy to protect subway and train 
systems.  
Modifying a successful crime fighting strategy, CompStat, to deal with the 
complex problem of the threat of terrorism as it relates to the train and subway system, a 
practical strategy has been developed. It utilizes programs and initiatives that are already 
in place, but have never been put together in a cohesive manner and written down so they 
can be tested and managed properly. One of the main reasons why CompStat is so 
successful in reducing crime is because the precinct commander is held responsible for 
success or failure. This strategy will enable a manager to follow a guide to protect the 
train and subway system utilizing proven techniques in combating crime in addition to 
current successful counterterrorism techniques in use.   
The objective of the research was to quantify in a written strategy the measures, 
both crime and counterterrorism related, that are in place to protect the New York City 
Subway System, while showing that the strategy is applicable to all mass transit train and 
subway systems in large metropolitan areas. This was accomplished by examining 
programs already in use in the New York City Police Department for counterterrorism, as 
well as, crime reduction and by culling the best practices and placing them into a written 
strategy. By examining and combining the best practices from these two programs, a 
realistic layered strategic approach to protect the incredibly porous train and subway 
system was developed.        
It contributes to the existing literature by creating a written strategy that does not 
exist, therefore filling a void in the literature. The main strength of the thesis is that it 
combines a layered approach, utilizing assets many cities already may have and just 
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redirects these resources to concentrate on a very likely target. The benefit of the lives 
saved will be invaluable and will be worth any additional costs, if any, that may be 
incurred. 
Another important recommendation this thesis makes is that municipalities should 
start thinking of terrorism along the same lines that it deals with crime. When combating 
crime, the deployment of resources is driven by intelligence collected on the most likely 
areas where major crimes are likely to occur. The resources are deployed in the most 
effective manor with the end result being a reduction in crime through prevention or 
apprehension of perpetrators. The deployment of resources and any subsequent arrests 
does not totally eradicate crime, but does reduce the threat of further crimes to an 
acceptable level for society to function normally. The same approach needs to be taken 
when we are dealing with terrorism. Transit systems should deploy resources and 
technology in areas driven by intelligence collection and analysis so that the threat of a 
major terrorist attack is reduced to a level that society can accept and continue to 
function.  
No major city can overact and make their mass transit system so secure that it 
becomes unusable for the public. The very nature of a mass transit system relies on rapid 
movement of a large volume of passengers. Retired Colonel and Director of the Institute 
for Homeland Security, Randall J. Larsen, has stated, “One of the primary goals of 
terrorism is to create fear and to cause people — leaders and citizens — to overreact. We 
must not help terrorists achieve their goals.”49  
The threat of terrorism should not become a paralyzing force and make 
municipalities spend unacceptably large amounts of money on mass transit security. One 
of Al Qaeda’s main goals is to cause financial ruin to the United States and eventually to 
ruin the economy. Osama Bin Laden made this very clear when he stated: 
                                                 
49 Randall J. Larsen, Our Own Worst Enemy, New York: Grand Central Publishing, 2007, 26. 
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 We bled Russia for ten years until it went bankrupt and was forced to 
withdraw in defeat….We are continuing in the same policy to make 
America bleed profusely to the point of bankruptcy.50  
By implementing complete screening of passengers and baggage on every train 
system as they do at airports, or by retrofitting every subway and train car to become 
blast proof, the system would not be economically viable. Almost all train and subway 
systems already have to rely on government subsidies to remain afloat, so adding to that 
cost will cause economic ruin.51 When discussing how to realistically mitigate the threat 
of terrorism, Larsen further recommends, “Development of standards for prevention, 
mitigation, and incident management programs that are fiscally sustainable for the long 
haul.”52  
The best way to prevent the terrorists from obtaining their goal, which is to cause 
so much fear that we change our way of life and to cause the United States economic 
ruin, is to diminish the threat and damage as much as possible. The most efficient way to 
do that is through a proven and practical crime fighting approach. The NYPD’s CompStat 
system has reduced violent crime to record low numbers in New York and by taking the 
same approach to countering terrorism, this thesis contends that the threat of violent 
terrorism on the subway system can be equally reduced.  
A CompStat counterterrorism strategy would be to apply the concepts of crime 
fighting to the threat of terrorist attacks within New York, specifically when dealing with 
the threat of terrorism on the train and subway systems. This strategy is not a foolproof 
approach that promises complete and total protection. Such a strategy may not even be 
possible and certainly would not be logistically or economically viable.  
                                                 
50 Gal Luft, “Al Qaeda’s economic war against the United States,” Energy Security, January 24, 2005. 
http://www.iags.org/n0124052.html [accessed November 15, 2006].  
51 Associated Press, “House refuses to cut rail subsidy,” USA Today, July 24, 2007 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-07-24-amtrak_N.htm [accessed February 18, 2008]. 
52 Larsen, Our Own Worst Enemy, 86. 
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By taking a proven law enforcement approach, specifically to protecting the train 
and subway systems, an acceptable level of risk can be achieved and effective protection 
can be applied, while allowing the system to remain economically viable.  
This is exactly what this thesis has accomplished, providing a realistic and 
actionable strategy to mitigate the very real threat of a terrorist attack on a train or 
subway system.   
This hypothesis of applying a CompStat model to combating terrorism, 
specifically as it relates to the train and subway system, has been tested by first 
examining whether the CompStat system itself is a valid and successful strategy that 
could translate to other municipalities around the country. Once this was accomplished, 
the CompStat system components were examined to ensure that it would apply to a 
counterterrorism strategy. Finally, the new CompStat counterterrorism strategy was 
examined to ensure that it could translate to other train and subway systems.  
D. METHODOLOGY 
The analytical framework for this thesis draws upon the previously implemented 
NYPD CompStat strategy and policies and compares them to current counterterrorism 
procedures in place within the NYPD. By examining and testing the validity of the  
NYPD’s CompStat approach to fighting crime, the author was able to test the viability of 
his strategy because it used the same strategy but applied it to the threat of terrorism on 
the train and subway system.  
Data was collected by examining case studies in New York and the results of a 
full-scale exercise that was sponsored by the New York City Office of Emergency 
Management. The exercise, which included all of the first responders within the City of 
New York, such as the NYPD, the Fire Department and various other agencies, occurred 
on August 26, 2007. The scenario used for this exercise was an explosion and subsequent 
fire onboard an Amtrak train within Pennsylvania Station, New York. Whereas the 
exercise did not test the preventative aspects of protecting the train and subway system, it 
did test the current emergency procedures in place, such as evacuation and response.  
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The results of the full-scale exercise were used to examine the suitability of the 
current evacuation and emergency response procedures considering the type of terrorist 
threat that New York currently faces.  
Additionally, all available programs currently in place, evacuation plans and 
emergency incident plans were examined. Onsite visits to operating sites such as the New 
York City Rail Control Center, the NYPD’s Counterterrorism Division, the New York 
City Command and Control Center and the New York City Subway System were 
conducted. 
Interviews of current practitioners in this arena were conducted to examine and 
research the counterterrorism practices currently in place in New York City. Based upon 
the performance history of Compstat as it relates to crime reduction and the existing 
counterterrorism practices in the current literature and in practical use, as well as 
examination of the results of the full-scale exercise, a recommendation of a strategy to 
protect the train and subway system is proposed.  
This thesis will examine whether the CompStat System is a valid and successful 
strategy and will include a review of whether a counterterrorism strategy to protect the 
train and subway system can follow the CompStat approach. Following that examination, 
the proposed new CompStat counterterrorism strategy will thoroughly describe each 
component: intelligence, detection, effective deployment, relentless follow-up, and 
recovery. Finally, the thesis ends with a conclusion of whether the new strategy is viable 
or not. 
1. CompStat 
In order to test the theory that a Compstat counterterrorism strategy will reduce 
the threat of terrorism in the train and subway system, the validity of the CompStat 
strategy must be examined. One indication of whether it is a viable strategy is to 
impartially check crime statistics. After all, an essential test of a crime reduction strategy 
is to examine if it actually reduces crime. 
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The CompStat system concentrates on the seven major crimes of: murder, rape, 
robbery, burglary, felony assault, grand larceny and grand larceny auto.53 The CompStat 
system measures these crimes because they are part of the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report 
that it publishes each year on crime statistics for the entire country.54   
An examination of the crime statistics in New York City for the years since 
CompStat was implemented through 2007 was conducted. This assessment revealed a 
reduction in the crimes measured of more than 77%, from 312,332 crimes committed in 
1995 to only 120,516 committed in 2007.55  
Below is a reproduction of CompStat report from the NYPD website that clearly 
shows the reduction over the years: 
   
 
56 
Figure 1.    CompStat report shows past reductions 
                                                 
53 NYPD CompStat website, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/crime_statistics/cscity.pdf 
[accessed  February 18, 2008].  
54 FBI website, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/prelim2007/table3.htm [accessed  February 23, 2008]. 
55 NYPD CompStat website.  
56 Ibid. 
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The statistical evidence has shown that a reduction in crime can be directly 
correlated to the implementation of the CompStat system. Because of this apparent 
success, it has been duplicated across the country. From New York City, all the way to 
Los Angeles, California, many cities have implemented CompStat and crime reduction 
has followed.57 Almost 60 percent of the larger police departments, those with 500 or 
more sworn officers, have implemented a Compstat-like program.58 Cities such as 
Baltimore, Atlanta, New Orleans and Los Angeles have all experienced significant crime 
reductions after implementing a CompStat strategy.59 
Besides the empirical data, research has shown the experts in the field of criminal 
justice have stated that the NYPD’s CompStat strategy is successful: Since its 
introduction in early 1994, Compstat has proven to be highly effective in achieving the 
goals for which it was initially intended.60 
Compstat has already been recognized as a major innovation in American 
policing. In the few years since its appearance, police departments around 
the country have begun to adopt Compstat or variations of it. The program 
has received national publicity, including awards from Harvard University 
and former Vice President Al Gore, and has been credited by its 
originators and proponents with impressive reductions in crime and 
improvements in neighborhood quality of life.61 
Compstat has been recognized as an effective and successful management tool 
and was a recipient of the prestigious Innovations in American Government Awards in 
                                                 
57 Los Angels Police Department Compstat website, http://www.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/cityprof.pdf 
[accessed February 23, 2008]. 
58 David Weisburd, Stephen D. Mastrofski, Rosann Greenspan, and James J. Willis,  “The Growth of 
Compstat in American Policing,” Police Foundation Reports,  April 2004, 12.  
59The Crime Fighters Criminal Justice Network website,  
http://www.thecrimefighters.net/crime_reduction.htm [accessed March 5, 2008]. 
60 Vincent Henry, “Managing Crime and Quality of Life Using COMPSTAT: Specific Issues in 
Implementation and Practice,” 117. http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_rms/no68/08_Dr.%20Henry-
2_p117-132.pdf [accessed March 5, 2008]. 
61 Weisburd et al.,“The Growth of CompStat in American Policing.” 
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1996. This prestigious award is conferred jointly by the Ford Foundation and Harvard 
University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government.62  
Through an examination of statistical data, opinions and literature from experts in 
Criminal Justice and the fact that the CompStat strategy has been honored with esteemed 
awards, it convincingly appears that CompStat is a successful crime reducing strategy.  
2. Does CompStat Translate to Counterterrorism? 
It appears that CompStat is a valid crime reduction strategy, but that does not 
indicate that it will unilaterally translate to a counterterrorism strategy. An examination 
of the major components of the CompStat strategy was conducted to assess whether it 
would be viable to incorporate them into a counterterrorism strategy. 
As previously described, the first component of the CompStat crime reduction 
strategy is intelligence. It is vital in combating crime and research has shown that it is 
also vital in a counterterrorism strategy. In fact some counterterrorism experts have stated 
that it is the “key” to a counterterrorism strategy.63 
The second component of the CompStat strategy is detection, which is 
accomplished in crime fighting by victims, witnesses and video cameras. Detection is an 
integral part of counterterrorism as airline passengers find out every time they go to an 
airport and have their bags searched and have to pass through a metal detector. The 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) agents are trying to find, or detect, a 
potential terrorist and any weapons he may carry.64        
                                                 
62 Vincent E. Henry, “CompStat  Management in the NYPD: Reducing Crime and  Improving  
Quality of Life in New York City,” 102. 
http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_rms/no68/07_Dr.%20Henry-1_p100-116.pdf [accessed March 5, 
2008].  
63 Michael Sheehan during Ed Bradley interview for “60 Minutes,” “Inside the NYPD’s Anti-Terror 
Fight,” http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/03/17/60minutes/main1416824.shtml [accessed February 18, 
2008].  
64 Transportation Security Administration website,  
http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/screening/security_checkpoints.shtm [accessed February 23, 2008]. 
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The next component of the CompStat strategy is effective deployment. TSA 
agents are deployed at airports in order to prevent a potential terrorist from boarding a 
plane. Deployment is certainly a major component of a counterterrorism strategy.  
The final component of a Compstat crime fighting strategy is relentless follow-up. 
This entails criminal investigations and basic detective work. Investigations or ‘follow-
up’ is a main focus of counterterrorism. In fact, an FBI Press release in 2002 reported that 
almost 500 special agents were moved from investigating crime to investigating 
counterterrorism.65  
It is apparent from an examination of the research conducted that the components 
of CompStat could easily translate to a counterterrorism strategy. In fact, the key 
components of the CompStat strategy are the key components of any counterterrorism 
strategy. 
 
Elements of a Strategy
 
Crime Reduction Terrorism Prevention 
Intelligence 9  9  
Detection 9  9  
Effective 
Deployment 
9  9  
Relentless 
Follow-up 
9  9  
Table 1.   Comparison of elements of crime reduction and terrorism prevention 
 
In fact some homeland security experts are calling for a CompStat approach to 
counterterrorism. Heather MacDonald, a fellow at the Manhattan Institute has written that 
the NYPD Compstat tools “are tailor-made for combating terrorism.”66 She further states 
                                                 
65 FBI website, http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel02/dojoig100102.htm [accessed February 23, 
2008]. 
66 Heather MacDonald, “Keeping New York Safe for Terrorists,” The City Journal, Autumn 2001, 
http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/HeatherMacDonald.htm [accessed March 5, 2008]. 
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that the system should be used across the country: The FBI’s anti-terrorism efforts should 
be Compstated in every city where the bureau operates.67 
Dr. Vincent Henry, an Associate Professor and Director of the Homeland Security 
Management Institute at Long Island University, who has studied the CompStat process, 
also agrees that it could apply to combating terrorism: 
The same strengths that make Compstat work to reduce crime or to 
manage an entire city can easily be brought to bear on the threat of 
terrorism, with the same potential for success.68 
With the validity of the CompStat strategy recognized and the knowledge that the 
main components of the strategy translate well into a counterterrorism strategy, the 
following is a description of a Compstat strategy to protect the train and subway system.  
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II. INTELLIGENCE 
Intelligence collection and distribution is a central theme throughout the CompSat 
crime fighting process. It drives all of the other parts of the process and is integral to its 
success. For any CompStat counterterrorism strategy to be successful, the intelligence 
component is invaluable. Former Deputy Commissioner of Counterterrorism for the 
NYPD, Michael Sheehan has stated: "The key to counter-terrorism is intelligence"69 
Knowing this fact about intelligence, Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly 
transformed the NYPD:"I knew we had to configure the department differently. We had 
to change our mindset."70 
This need to be innovative and bold in their protection of their citizens led the 
NYPD to develop a Counterterrorism Bureau and redirect the focus of the Intelligence 
Division. One of the most significant changes the NYPD made was to increase the 
officers assigned to collect intelligence both inside the city, but also outside. In fact the 
NYPD has assigned officers overseas to collect intelligence. The old way of doing 
business and waiting for intelligence to flow down from the federal government was not 
working. Commissioner Kelly has made this very clear: 
We need the information. We’re a city, the only U.S. City, of course, 
that’s been attacked, twice successfully, by terrorists. We can’t rely solely 
on other agencies to protect us here. So there’s nothing like self-help, and 
that’s what we’re doing.71 
It is not the fault of the federal government. They do not have the resources to 
combat the new breed of terrorism. Homeland security experts have expressed this 
sentiment: 
When terrorists crashed planes into the Pentagon and the World Trade 
Towers on September 11th, the first calls for help went out to the police 
and other local first responders—not to the CIA or the FBI. In order to 
                                                 
69 Ed Bradley interview for “60 Minutes.”  
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid.  
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prevent or recover from any future terrorist attacks, local officials and 
police must be prepared to take the lead in the war on terror and not wait 
for direction from federal agencies hundreds of miles away. Rather than 
passively acquiescing to dictates from Washington, America’s police 
chiefs and other urban leaders must build on their successful experience of 
the last 15 years and design new programs to share criminal and terrorist 
related intelligence; penetrate and disrupt potential terrorist cells in the 
cities and towns where they operate; and develop their own “best 
practices” for combating suicide bombers and protecting local critical 
infrastructure. Anyone—at the local or federal level—who thinks that 
federal agents can adequately shoulder this responsibility ignore the fact 
the FBI has less than 10,000 agents nationwide, and that the CIA is 
focused on collecting foreign, not domestic intelligence.72 
Due to the perceived need for intelligence, the NYPD, although robust, is still a 
local law enforcement organization, that created its own international intelligence 
network. Homeland security officials have stated that: 
The NYPD, with its extensive counterterrorism division that monitors 
foreign news services and actually has officers stationed overseas, is 
widely recognized as the gold standard in this regard.73 
The NYPD reformed itself in the wake of 9/11. They already had the most robust 
Joint FBI Terrorism Task Force in the nation, but it was not enough. Commissioner 
Raymond Kelly brought in counterterrorism experts from outside the department to assist 
with the transformation. Experts from the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States 
Military and Academia have all contributed to the reform.  
Some of the programs developed include the “International Liaison Program,” 
which involves assigning NYPD personnel to a number of different posts throughout 
several countries.74 There are ten (10) posts in eight (8) different countries. The officers 
assigned to these posts are to liaison with the local law enforcement intelligence 
community and assist in analyzing any intelligence information, with a particular 
                                                 
72 Timothy P. Connors and Georgia Pellegrini, “Hard Lessons Won: Policing Terrorism in the United 
States,” Safe Cities Project, the Manhattan Institute, July 2005, 5. .http://www.manhattan-
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73 Sahm, Hard Won Lessons, 8.  
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emphasis on the impact of the information on New York.75 They are to provide a direct 
link to the NYPD to relay information, unfettered by other United States intelligence 
agencies. The idea is to provide information as fast as possible to the most targeted and 
most likely location for future terrorists’ attacks, New York City. The program was 
developed after frustration with the old way of doing business, such as waiting for the 
FBI to pass on information concerning New York in a timely manner. The program has 
now been in place for several years and the officers involved have quickly passed on 
information from the scene of terrorist incidents around the world, including the train 
bombings in Madrid. 
The Manhattan Institute for Policy Research has stated: 
As a direct result of the officers’ observations of vulnerabilities in 
Madrid’s transit system, New York City made immediate tactical 
adjustments in its own subway security.76  
The tactical changes observed by the Manhattan Institute should also inform the 
national strategy. This is a positive indication that this type of program can directly assist 
in a national strategy to protect a local municipality’s train and subway system. 
The officers assigned to these posts are not taking traditional law enforcement 
action in the foreign countries; instead, as described in an internal NYPD message, they 
are “gathering accurate and reliable information on a wide range of law enforcement 
topics, quickly responding to critical incidents within a region of responsibility and 
making and maintaining international law enforcement contacts.”77 Their main function 
is to establish professional relationships with the local law enforcement agency and report 
any meaningful intelligence information directly back to the NYPD, without delay.  
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The proposed Foreign Liaison Officers Against Terrorism (FLOAT) Grant 
Program78 would open up this idea to police departments throughout the country. This 
idea was developed because: 
Major city law enforcement executives agree that one of the best ways to 
help thwart terrorist attacks in this country is to send liaisons from their 
departments to their counterparts overseas in order to boost their 
understanding of how terrorists are operating internationally and to obtain 
on-the-scene situational awareness whenever attacks occur abroad.79  
The program would allow departments to identify foreign cities where a presence 
is desired, divide those cities among the departments participating in the program and 
assign particular agencies to staff those positions. These departments would then share 
what they learn from their liaisons abroad with the other departments participating in the 
program.80 The FLOAT program appears to be a way for any police department tasked 
with providing protection of a train or subway system to deploy officers internationally 
even if they have limited resources. This program is acknowledgment that local police 
departments, who do not have the resources of the larger departments, such as the NYPD, 
still need the vital international intelligence information.  
Besides the Intelligence Division, the NYPD also has a Counterterrorism Bureau 
that is tasked with analyzing current terrorist trends and providing effective deployment 
strategies to prevent an attack. One unit within the Counterterrorism Bureau is the 
Terrorist Threat Analysis Group (TTAG) which is composed of both veteran NYPD 
detectives and highly educated civilian analysts who examine world events, both “open 
source” and in classified material, in order to make recommendations for deployment of 
resources and procurement of equipment. 
Another section of the Counterterrorism Bureau is the NYPD SHIELD program, 
which is a partnership with the public that provides counterterrorism information quickly 
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and directly to public companies and corporations. These companies, such as the New 
York Stock Exchange and American Express, are very often the targets of the terrorists 
and have their own security procedures, which are often enhanced by the information 
distributed. Sometimes, federal agencies hold unclassified information too long instead of 
pushing it out to the public companies that can benefit from the information. One 
example would be the unsuccessful attempt to bomb the London nightclub, “Tiger, 
Tiger”. Just days before that attempted attack, the nightclubs in London were issued an 
unclassified 53-page report warning them about vehicle borne improvised explosive 
devices (VBIED), amongst other terrorist tactics, from the National Counter Terrorism 
Security Office.81 It is unknown if this report was instrumental in the discovery of the 
two VBIEDS, but the important part is that the United Kingdom published and shared 
this information with the private sector. As of the publication of this thesis, the FBI has 
distributed no such report locally.  
The NYPD is changing that by providing accurate and timely unclassified 
information to its SHIELD members through SHIELD briefs. These briefs are researched 
and written by the intelligence research specialists, the NYPD counterterrorism analysts, 
through open source as well as their international contacts that have been forged through 
the years. They are then emailed to NYPD members and published on the SHIELD 
website for private sector members to access.  
The main benefit is the speed of which the briefs are published. Several incidents, 
such as the plot to ignite the fuel transfer lines at JFK International Airport and the 
assassination of Benazir Bhutto, were published on the website a few short hours after the 
incidents became public.82 The major news networks constantly broadcast vital information 
much quicker than any reliable government agency. The SHIELD briefs are an attempt to 
investigate and evaluate all of the current open source information on an incident, analyze 
that information and then consider the implications for New York. Once that has been 
accomplished, the priority becomes placing that information in an accurate, informative, and 
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easily digestible format for the public and for private security partners to receive so that they 
may take adequate precautions. The SHIELD briefs are certainly the only one of its kind 
coming from a “local” police department. 
The program does not require a great deal of funding or personnel resources to 
operate, so other departments across the country could develop a similar program of their 
own.    
Below is an actual example of a SHIELD brief that was created by the NYPD 






Figure 2.   SHIELD brief created by the NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau.  
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Instead of waiting for information and training to be passed on, the NYPD has 
developed its own programs and initiatives. “Radicalization in the West: The 
Homegrown Threat”83 is a publication based on years of research by NYPD intelligence 
analysts who have studied past cases and developed a formula for identifying possible 
steps to radicalization. No other law enforcement agency in the United States, whether 
federal or local, has developed such an analysis. A senior analyst with the RAND 
Corporation has stated, “Although there have been informative analyses of the paths to 
violent jihad in individual countries, the NYPD report is the most comprehensive review 
across national boundaries.” 84     
As the NYPD has demonstrated, local law enforcement does not need to take a 
backseat to any federal law enforcement agencies. In an ideal world, local, state and 
federal law enforcement would all work seamlessly together. Reality, however, proves 
that to be quite difficult. Not all police departments need to do as much as the NYPD, but 
some should be doing more to protect their cities and states from attacks. Simply relying 
on the federal resources to provide accurate and timely intelligence is not appropriate in 
today’s age of terrorism, where radicalized “homegrown” terrorists come from within the 
very local community those police departments protect.  
There have been several “homegrown” cases in various states throughout the 
country, including upstate New York, Portland, Oregon, and Northern Virginia, as well 
as right in New York City. These homegrown cases highlight the importance of local 
intelligence; it will be the local law enforcement agencies that will have to discover these 
particular plots. 
Fusion centers were originally created to improve the sharing of anti-terrorism 
intelligence among different state, local and federal law enforcement agencies.85 The 
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centers are popular, mainly because of federal funding, and because they solve some of 
the problems of information sharing. Sometimes, however, they are prevented from even 
passing the information along because of the issue of federal security clearances. A 2007 
Government Accountability Office report stated that forty-four of the fifty-eight fusion 
centers examined had trouble obtaining and using security clearances. Nineteen fusion 
centers also reported problems between DHS and the FBI recognizing each other’s 
clearances.86  
Knowing how to properly utilize all of the intelligence is not always easy. A local 
law enforcement agency must understand the threat they face to judiciously use 
intelligence they receive. They need to know the community they serve to adequately 
understand the threats they face. Only by having a local intelligence system in place, can 
they accomplish this feat. 
It does not have to be so robust and formalized in all cases. Larger police 
departments should have a formal structure so its officers know how and where to report 
any information they have, but some of the smaller departments may benefit from a more 
informal intelligence structure. Smaller departments may only perform uniform patrol 
and not even conduct their own criminal investigations. They may rely on the state or 
others to conduct their formal criminal investigations. This does not preclude them from 
having an informal system regarding gathering intelligence. It may be as simple as 
developing a culture within the agency where they are aware of possible terrorist 
activities. This may include being able to spot suspicious materials during automobile 
traffic stops or from noticing odd or suspicious behavior from their local residents. The 
main idea is to develop a rationale for the particular local police agency to play a role in 
intelligence gathering. 
Some of the reasons local law enforcement agencies should create their own 
intelligence agencies are because the intelligence you create is yours to utilize and a local 
police department knows its own vulnerabilities better than any federal agency does. 
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When a local police department creates intelligence, it can disseminate that intelligence 
how it sees fit. This is important when it comes to dealing with intelligence due to the 
issue of clearances.  
Getting federal security clearances is a time consuming and costly undertaking. 
Clearances can take anywhere from six months to over a year. That is a very long time 
when it comes to having information that may be useful for an agency. The intelligence 
distribution needs to occur quickly because as Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police 
Chief Cathy Lanier stated in testimony before congress: 
If we learn about a threat only when it becomes imminent, it’s too late.87 
If a police department obtains information through its own sources, it can then use 
that information and share it amongst its members without worrying about which 
members have security clearances and which ones do not. This becomes a major issue 
when trying to spread a “culture of preparedness” amongst patrol forces, but not being 
able to tell them about threat information that is classified. Of course, information can be 
sanitized so it can be spread, but that very often makes the information so unspecific that 
it looses a majority of its impact.  
When a department is constantly trying to have its patrol force remain vigilant, 
being able to tell them specific information about ongoing plots or cases helps make the 
officers more receptive to mundane, although important assignments. One of the lessons 
learned from the 9/11 Commission was a failure to share intelligence.  One of the 
criticisms of the commission concerning intelligence sharing stated: 
Security concerns need to be weighed against the costs. Current security 
requirements nurture over-classification and excessive compartmentation 
of information among agencies. 88  
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Every local law enforcement agency knows its area better than any one else. 
Whereas a local cop knows the streets he patrols, local police departments know the cities 
and towns for which they are responsible. That local knowledge is important when 
figuring out vulnerabilities regarding targets and critical infrastructure. Information in the 
correct hands is very valuable, but without the local knowledge of vulnerabilities, there 
can be no true valuable intelligence. 
Local police departments also know the community they protect. They know the 
people in the community and the people know them because of outreach programs such 
as community policing and community meetings. With the specter of “homegrown” 
terrorism on the rise, information about radicalized members of the Muslim community, 
in particular, is more likely to be passed on to local police, who have more rapport with 
the community than any federal entity. The people best suited to deal with these local 
threats are the “local” law enforcement agencies. 
Terrorism expert Clark McCauley states: 
Fighting terrorism effectively is more like police work than military 
combat. Effective police work requires understanding local culture, 
knowing the details of social and physical geography in a local area, 
developing local relationships, and cultivating local sources of 
information.89  
Sometimes passing the information internally, down to the patrol officers on the 
streets in larger departments, can be an issue. The NYPD collects and publishes a 
tremendous amount of intelligence information, but this information is useless unless it is 
put in the minds of the patrol officers. The way the NYPD passes on the information is 
through the use of the Intelligence Division’s field intelligence officers who are assigned 
to each precinct, Housing Public Service Area (PSA) and transit district. They not only 
pass on the intelligence information, they act as a “local” deposit within the NYPD for 
information collected in the field.  
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Another way the intelligence information is passed on to the patrol officers is 
through the use of a video teleconference system.90 This video teleconference system was 
originally designed to allow NYPD executives from a central location, such as their 
offices at One Police Plaza, to communicate with each and every officer on patrol at the 
same time, since each precinct, PSA and transit district has them installed. Their image 
and sound would broadcast simultaneously throughout the entire department. The system 
was later adapted to play pre-recorded roll call training videos that used to play on VHS 
tapes and players.  
Using this current system, the intelligence products are modified into a video 
format by either scanning them into digital form or by adapting the information contained 
therein into a PowerPoint or video format. They are then broadcast from a central hub to 
the entire department. This is an effective tool utilized during roll call training, especially 
when new information has been obtained and patrol officers need to be alerted. 
The current national intelligence framework is flawed when it comes to sharing 
information with local authorities. With this in mind, local police departments in cities 
and states with train and subway systems cannot take the risk that information will be 
passed on in a timely manner. They must take their destiny in their own hands and act 
boldly. The costs of failure are too high to wait for the intelligence community to correct 
any deficiencies in their intelligence sharing. Only by taking the initiative and procuring 
their own intelligence will they stand a chance at successfully defending their train and 
subway systems from terrorists who are intent on doing them harm.  
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III. DETECTION 
If the first layer in a CompStat strategy to protect a train or subway system is 
intelligence collection and dissemination, then the next layer is detection.  
One of the most popular and useful tools in detection is video cameras. Although 
New York City has hundreds of video cameras in use, no scholastic study of camera 
systems in the train and subway system would be complete without examining the 
London Underground. 
The London Underground has the most advanced closed circuit camera system of 
any transportation system. Throughout their system, approximately 6,000 cameras record 
the images while personnel are assigned to view the images in real time. Transit security 
experts have reported: 
The London Underground is a prime example of forensic security design. 
With more than 6,000 closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras located in 
trains and at nearly all stations, police officers assigned to the underground 
can review video after any incident and find out what happened.91 
Their system is a model for others to follow and was instrumental in gathering 
information on the terrorists of both July 7, 2005 and July 21, 2005. The cameras 
played an integral part of their investigation: 
Senior sources at the Yard said they were seizing film from an estimated 
2,000 cameras in the biggest operation of its kind. Film from every tube 
train and station will be examined as well as footage from the 12 main line 
termini and scores of platform cameras and trains across the British Rail 
network.92 
In order to be more effective, “Smart” cameras are needed, rather than having 
officers just viewing images from multiple cameras, which could be quite numerous in a 
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subway or train system. Currently in the development and testing stage is computer 
software that analyzes images for suspicious activity and behavior. 
One such system analyzed and tested by the NYPD Counterterrorism Division is 
the IBM Smart Surveillance System (S3).93 This system is able to recognize unusual 
behavior and alert an officer. How the system works is by having normal activities 
programmed in and then recognized by the software.  
For example, a person is walking down the street, carrying a backpack. He stops 
at a building for a few moments and then proceeds forward. This would be normal 
behavior. Abnormal behavior would be for the same person to be walking down the 
street, stop at the building for a few minutes, place the backpack on the ground and then 
walk away, leaving the backpack behind.  
The video analytic software actually can detect this abnormal behavior and alert a 
user of the system that something unusual has occurred. The user can then conduct a 
further examination of the behavior to determine if there is any malicious intent. The 
same software can determine if the same person is in an area for a prolonged period of 
time or continues to walk around an area, as if conducting surveillance on a location.  
The system uses current and archived footage to compare and search for the same 
image of that person and then compare their images. There may be a legitimate excuse 
for such action, such as a food delivery person making multiple deliveries to the same 
location. The main benefit of the analytic tool is that it alerts a human user of the fact so 
that an investigation into the behavior can be conducted. 
This particular IBM Smart Surveillance System was tested by the NYPD 
Counterterrorism Division on October 27, 2007, at the New York Stock Exchange. The 
system worked as promised and was able to identify persons who left bags on the ground 
and then walked away from them.94 The system alerted the user by flashing information 
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on the video screen. This analytic software along with a robust camera deployment  
will make for a comprehensive detection tool.  
Below is an image of the actual video footage with the analytic software used 
during the test. 
 
 
(Image supplied by the NYPD Counterterrorism Division Video Production Unit) 
Figure 3.   Picture of actual video footage of analytical software.  
Another aspect of detection and information gathering involves the millions of 
passengers who commute each day on the train system. In New York, it is estimated that 
5.1 million people ride the subway each day.95 In order to use those passengers to help in 
the fight against terrorism, a public awareness campaign has been implemented.  
The “If You See Something, Say Something” campaign is a public relations 
program that informs the public that they should contact the authorities if they spot any 
suspicious packages or persons.96  
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Figure 4.   "If You See Something, Say Something" Advertisement. 
 
The campaign informs people to: 
• Be alert to unattended packages.  
• Be wary of suspicious behavior.  
• Take notice of people in bulky or inappropriate clothing.  
• Report exposed wiring or other irregularities.  
• Report anyone tampering with surveillance cameras or entering 
unauthorized areas.97 
This allows the riding public to feel empowered in the fight against terrorism and 
to generate a large amount of intelligence information. Homeland security experts agree 
that the campaign is a positive step: 
Active civic outreach efforts — such as the MTA’s ‘If you see something, 
say something’ campaign — stressing the need for train passengers to 
quickly report suspicious behavior or packages should be implemented.98  
The public has been a vital part in crime reduction by reporting the crimes they 
witness as well as the suspicious behavior they observe. This has not only occurred in 
New York City, but across the entire nation. They are needed in the current time when 
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the specter of terrorism looms, especially in the subway and train systems. By utilizing 
the public as a ‘detection’ system, an agency can exponentially increase the chance of 
detecting suspicious persons and packages.  
Another resource for detection is the large number of employees that all subway 
and train systems utilize. By properly training these employees on what to be aware of 
through numerous terrorism-awareness courses and providing them with an easy-to-use 
reporting system, a municipality can greatly enhance their own detection ability. These 
employees should have reporting suspicious persons or packages as a core responsibility 
because they know the subway and train systems the best. The vast majority of these 
employees know the trains, tunnels and passengers better than anyone else; that expertise 
should be utilized and exploited for proactive detection.    
In addition to training the public and employees to be more aware of their 
surroundings for terrorism related issues, the officers on patrol with the train and subway 
system have to be better trained. Within the theory of “collaborative capacity” there is the 
belief that the more education and training someone has received, the better decisions 
they will make as their environment grows more complex. This also allows an 
organization to decentralize and to have their employees use their professional judgment 
in complex situations.99  
With this theory in mind, the more education and training the numerous front line 
patrol officers in a police department receive, the better decisions they will make when 
confronted with the complex situation of potential terrorists conducting pre-operational 
surveillance or conducting an actual attack. There are a variety of terrorism specific 
training programs that all officers on patrol in a subway or train system should have to 
make them more effective, such as Hostile Surveillance Detection and Behavior 
Recognition courses.  
It is well documented that terrorists will conduct “dry runs” of their intended 
target. According to a Joint Homeland Security document that was posted on MSNBC: 
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7 July 2005 London Bombings: The operatives discreetly practiced a 
mock attack while riding the London subway in late June 2005 
1994 “Operation Bojinka” Plot: Ramzi Yousef planned to 
simultaneously bomb multiple airplanes while flying over the Pacific 
Ocean and his group conducted dry runs in environments similar to that of 
the intended targets. 
August 2006 Plot to Blow up Airliners Using Liquid Explosives: 
Terrorists discussed dry runs to test airport security procedures.100 
It is during these “dry runs” that the terrorists are vulnerable to hostile 
surveillance detection by properly trained officers. By giving officers the Hostile 
Surveillance Detection course, an agency can increase the potential for intercepting a 
terrorist incident before it is executed. The Hostile Surveillance course teaches officers 
some of the characteristics that potential terrorists may exhibit, such as:  
• Observing security positions and officers 
• Demonstrating unusual or prolonged interest in entry and access points 
• Questioning security personnel 
• Taking pictures or drawing maps of areas that are non-tourist in nature 
• Remaining on the platforms even though several trains have passed 101 
By giving the officers who are on patrol each day this type of training, an agency 
exponentially increases the chance to intercept a terrorist attack in the planning stages, 
before it is too late.  
A variety of behavior recognition training courses is available, allowing 
municipalities to train their officers to recognize potentially suspicious behavior.102 
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These training systems portend to add another layer of threat mitigation training at 
critical infrastructure facilities, such as train and subway systems, by having trained 
officers identify certain characteristics exhibited by potential suspects. Some of these 
characteristics include nervousness, avoidance of eye contact with authorities, 
inappropriate clothing for the current weather, etc. While no municipality can rely on 
these behavior-recognition training systems alone, it can add to an officer’s awareness 
level and therefore may have some usefulness.  
Police officers are used to observing behavior in traditional crimes. Illegal gun 
possession was a crime that the NYPD’s Street Crime Unit concentrated on. The training 
for members of this unit included looking for a person who constantly touched or 
adjusted their waistband as they stepped off the curb and walked across the street. This 
was an indication that they may have a firearm that is loose in their waistband, not in a 
holster, which moves as they step off the curb. Whereas this was not the only indicator, 
that furtive movement, combined with other factors such as the high crime nature of the 
neighborhood and attempting to evade the officer as he approached, would often lead to 
reasonable suspicion and a frisk of the individual by the officer.103      
Specialized training programs, such as hostile surveillance and behavior 
recognition, are additional layers of training that patrol officers should have in order to 
make them more effective. Besides specialized training, those same patrol officers should 
be given continuous terrorism-awareness training. This training should be incorporated 
into regular roll call-type training, as well as during continuous training cycles.  
The training is necessary to prevent complacency among the front line officers, 
because as many homeland security experts have stated: 
Unfortunately, there is every reason to believe that terrorism is a long-term 
problem.104 
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IV. EFFECTIVE DEPLOYMENT 
Effectively deploying resources is very important to any municipality whether 
that agency has thousands of officers or just a few. In New York City, the NYPD’s 
CompStat process revolutionized police work and reduced crime dramatically. This 
strategy, which effectively deployed resources, resulted in historic crime reductions.  
Additionally, current Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly has not only 
continued the historic crime reductions, but has also added to the effective deployment 
with his “Operation Impact” strategy. “Operation Impact” is an NYPD program that 
targets specific high crime areas, which may cross traditional precinct boundaries by 
flooding the area with police resources. These resources consist mostly of patrol officers 
but also include cameras and floodlights, where needed. The effectiveness of “Operation 
Impact” has led to a record decline in homicides with just 492 occurring in 2007, the 
lowest on record, since reliable records were recorded in 1963.105   
Terrorism experts have stated that battling terrorism is more similar to police 
work that military combat.106 With this in mind, the NYPD’s knowledge revolutionized 
how effective deployment addresses crime; the way it addresses terrorism was examined, 
specifically, how the NYPD deploys assets to address terrorism in its vast subway 
system.   
The one agency that is deploying resources in a proactive, preventive manner is 
the NYPD. The “Hercules” and “Critical Response Vehicle Surge” deployments, as well 
as, the “Random Bag Screening” and “Transit Order Maintenance Sweeps (TOMS),” 
along with others, are models that any police department can follow. 
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A. HERCULES DEPLOYMENTS 
The “Hercules” deployments are small but highly visible teams of officers that are 
meant to disrupt the standard patrol posture. These deployments are based upon current 
intelligence and are usually directed at previously targeted areas or high visibility 
locations. These teams consist of heavily armed officers. In New York, that is the 
Emergency Service Unit officers, along with Intelligence Division detectives and 
Highway Unit personnel. 
The transit locations chosen are based upon previous intelligence, whether these 
locations were targeted in the past or are high value targets, such as Herald Square or 
highly visible locations such as Grand Central Station and Pennsylvania Station. The 
locations chosen are important because the concept behind the deployments is to disrupt 
any pre-operational surveillance by potential terrorists or to quickly respond to an 
incident at one of the targeted locations.  
The ESU officers are there to show a strong presence with heavy weapons and 
tactical gear, which has been shown in interviews with known terrorists to cause them 
fear and to adjust their targets.107 The Intelligence Division detectives are there to 
conduct interviews of potentially suspicious people in the area, as well as gather 
information from potential sources, such as shop owners. The Highway Unit personnel 
are there to act as a vehicle escort for the deployment and to help arrive at each 
destination in a safe and quick manner. 
B. CRITICAL RESPONSE VEHICLE SURGES 
The “Critical Response Vehicle (CRV) Surge” deployments consist of having a 
police vehicle from each precinct, Police Service Area and transit district in the city 
respond to a pre-designated location at a pre-determined time. In New York City, that 
entails almost one hundred vehicles, including the appropriate supervisors. The idea is to 
show a strong police presence by flooding high visibility locations or high value targets 
with police officers in order to prevent any pre-operational surveillance or an actual 
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attack. The locations are chosen based upon available intelligence and visibility of the 
location. The vehicles stay for a pre-determined time frame and then move in mass to 
another location, or break up into several different locations.108 
Locations chosen in New York City are frequently subway stations. Typically, the 
CRV officers respond to several of the high profile subway stations during the morning 
and evening rush hour, when the trains are most crowded and history has shown the 
terrorists are most likely to strike. They arrive at the station, enter the subway platform 
and conduct a visual inspection of the area. When the trains arrive, they conduct a quick 
inspection of the train cars before they pull out of the station. Besides the officers 
performing their proactive patrol, this system provides an outlet for the passengers to 
report any suspicious package or behavior. Passengers who are disinclined to make a 
phone call under the “See Something, Say Something” media campaign, will often 
mention something to a police officer if he or she is conveniently located at the scene. 
The most common example of this is the reporting of an unattended bag. Passengers will 
often report that there is an unattended bag left on a platform. Whereas none of these 
instances have discovered an explosive device, just the passenger awareness of their 
surroundings is encouraging.    
Another benefit of this deployment is the fact of having a substantial mobile force 
of officers should an incident occur. By taking officers from all around the city, a large 
force can be gathered without stripping any one area of all of their resources.  
In smaller departments, even one officer or one patrol vehicle performing directed 
patrol in a small surge at a train or subway platform may be enough to dissuade a 
terrorist. This small surge may be enough to disrupt pre-operational surveillance or an 
actual attack because history has shown that typical terrorist attacks operate “on a very 
thin margin.”109 This means that terrorists may cancel an operation if they believe they 
will not succeed because an unexpected patrol officer appeared. The idea is to deploy 
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intelligently. Placing the officers, however few, at the most crowded location and during 
the busiest times should be the most effective. Past history of transit attacks has shown 
that this is the most likely time that a potential terrorist will strike.     
C. RANDOM BAG SCREENING 
Another deployment and the most appropriate for securing a train or subway 
facility is the “Random Bag Screening”. Officers are redeployed from their usual 
assignments to different selected subway locations and search the bags of passengers as 
they enter the subway system. Since the number of subway locations is so vast, it would 
be manpower intensive to search the bags of passengers at every location, so selected 
stations are chosen each day on a random basis. The locations selected are once again 
based upon available intelligence along with the threat and visibility of each station.  
The screening of the passengers’ bags is done on a random basis;  this is to ensure 
there is no bias in whose  bags are searched. This procedure has been challenged in court 
by the American Civil Liberties Association but has withstood the challenge and has been 
declared legal.110  
Of course, if the officers conducting the screening witnessed someone acting 
suspiciously, they could then stop that person. If the encounter elevated to reasonable 
suspicion, the person could be frisked for a weapon or explosives. This would fall under 
the regular purview of normal police powers and not the constriction of the random bag 
screening. 
D. TRANSIT ORDER MAINTENANCE SWEEPS 
The Transit Order Maintenance Sweeps (TOMS) are performed using a team-led 
concept. Originally, they specifically targeted low-level criminal activity under the 
CompStat and “Broken Windows” strategies. Under a counterterrorism strategy, a 
supervisor, usually a sergeant with as many as eight  police officers — once again using 
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intelligence — will enter a predetermined subway platform and inspect the station for any 
suspicious activity or persons. They then board the train, with each officer entering a 
separate train car. They inspect the car for any suspicious packages or persons. Once they 
have finished the entire train, they will disembark that train and continue on to another 
train.  
E. EXPLOSIVE TRACE DETECTION 
Explosive trace detection is more technologically advanced than the basic random 
bag screenings. It entails a trained police officer wiping the outer garment or bag of a 
person with a swipe cloth and then placing that swab in a machine to identify any trace of 
explosive compounds. The machines the NYPD uses are handheld Sabre 4000 and can 
identify the chemical compounds within eight to ten seconds. They use a technology 
called ion mobility spectrometry. The ion mobility spectrometry (IMS) technique 
separates and detects electrically charged particles (ions) and sorts them according to how 
fast they travel through an electrical field in a tube.111 This identifies compounds found 
in explosives. Deploying these machines and officers require specialized training to 
ensure the operation is conducted properly. 
There can be no discussion of explosive detection patrol deployment without 
mentioning the use of K-9 patrols. They are truly remarkable and have considerable 
merits as well as some drawbacks. A dog’s ability to detect explosive material is truly 
remarkable. The sensitivity of a dog’s nose is superior to most field portable detection 
devices. Equally important, the canine nose is able to spatially locate explosive material, 
allowing the rapid search of a large area. In addition, canines are able to distinguish the 
presence of explosives in complex environments, such as a subway or train station. The 
disadvantages of using dogs are the extensive training requirements and their inability to 
work for extended periods. Currently, New York City, as well as some other public 
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transportation systems, has canine detection programs in operation.112 Using K-9 dogs 
for explosive detection in a transit environment is a decision that requires a long-term 
commitment and may only be possible for the larger municipalities.  
Effective deployment is not an absolute solution to the problem of terrorism. 
There are not enough officers on subway and train patrol to be in every train car or on 
every platform. By having these deployments based upon an intelligence assessment of 
the current condition, they can be very effective. Terrorism experts have stated: 
Unlike an airport or an office building, public transit systems cannot 
simply be closed off or tightly controlled without compromising their 
fundamental character. However, just because an absolute envelope of 
security may not be possible, that should not be an excuse to do 
nothing.113 
Additionally, David Cohen, the NYPD’s Deputy Commissioner for Intelligence, 
has said, “Unpredictability is the enemy of terrorists,” and, when discussing transit 
security, “More is better than some; some is better than none; and none helps the 
terrorists.”114 
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V. RELENTLESS FOLLOW-UP  
If the Compstat techniques of fighting crime are to be applied to combating 
terrorism, an examination of how criminals are apprehended is required. Whereas the 
police attempt to prevent crime by intelligently deploying their resources to areas of 
concern, serious and terrible crimes still occur. When these crimes do occur, an intense 
investigation takes place. Resources are dedicated until the perpetrators of the crime are 
apprehended — before they commit another similar crime. One such recent crime 
occurred on April 13, 2007, when a Columbia graduate student was accosted in her 
hallway and forced into her apartment. She was raped and brutalized for nineteen hours 
before the perpetrators tied her up and set the apartment on fire. She managed to survive 
the attack, but the perpetrator escaped. By scouring the neighborhood for witnesses, 
searching all video cameras in the neighborhood and checking past criminal records, a 
suspect was identified. When the perpetrator was arrested for a different crime, his name 
and description identified him as a suspect in the rape. The relentless follow-up lead to 
the suspect being arrested for the brutal rape seven days after it occurred.115     
The same holds true for terrorism incidents. Once an incident has occurred or a 
suspected plot has been uncovered, the follow-up investigation is critical to apprehending 
those responsible in order to prevent future attacks. Two examples support this frame of 
reasoning. 
1. The Assassination of Meir Kahane  
Meir Kahane was the founder of the radical Jewish Defense League and 
advocated the expulsion of all Arabs from Israel and the occupied territories. He was so 
radical that Israel’s parliament banned Kahane’s political party. At the end of an anti-
Arab speech at a New York hotel on November 5, 1990, El Sayyid Nosair, a 36-year-old 
Egyptian immigrant, walked up to Kahane, pulled out a gun and fatally shot him.116 He 
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was quickly apprehended by NYPD officers. It has been reported that when the police 
searched Nosair’s residence, they carried off forty-seven boxes of documents, 
paramilitary manuals, maps, and diagrams of buildings, including the World Trade 
Center.117 
Senior NYPD counterterrorism analysts have written: 
The assassination of Meir Kahane was the first act of radical Islamic 
terrorism on the U.S. homeland. The political climate in New York at the 
time may have swayed political and police authorities to dismiss it as an 
act of a lone gunman, putting emphasis on closing cases. This would prove 
deadly as later events such as the 1993 World Trade Center attack, and the 
1993 landmarks plot would tie directly to El Sayyid Nosair and those 
involved with him.118  
This incident was initially viewed as the act of a lone person, but an experienced 
counterterrorism analyst has concluded, “armed with the power of hindsight, it is now 
clear that the murder was part of a larger conspiracy.”119  
The lack of follow up in this incident allowed additional plots to go unnoticed. 
The documents recovered from Nosair’s residence were never translated from Arabic 
because there was no sense of urgency in the follow-up investigation. It has been reported 
that the documents recovered were not properly handled: “The FBI had taken possession. 
Three years later, the bureau discovered that Nosair’s documents, which it had never 
translated, anticipated the trade center attack.” 120 
2. Explosives on the London Underground 
Alternatively, a positive incident of relentless follow-up is the incident on the 
London Underground on July 21, 2005. Four potential suicide bombers attempted to 
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detonate their explosives on crowded trains but only ignited their detonators and not the 
full payload of explosives.121 The follow-up investigation led to their quick arrests.  
The local media reported on July 29, 2005: 
The arrests mean all four men captured on closed-circuit television and 
suspected in the bombing plot are now in custody: Muktar Said Ibrahim, 
Yasin Hassan Omar , Osman Hussain and a third unnamed man. Scotland 
Yard calls it their “best day yet.”122  
It is quite clear that incredibly swift arrest of these potential suicide bombers 
prevented another attack. If they were so dedicated to their cause of Islamic 
fundamentalism that they were willing to die, it stands to reason that these men would 
have tried another attack. 
During police investigations, relentless follow-up is necessary to apprehend 
criminals and to prevent these same criminals from perpetrating future crimes. The same 
holds true for terrorism-related investigations; relentless and thorough follow-up is 
necessary to apprehend terrorists and to prevent them from committing further acts of 
terror.  
Because the very nature of terrorism is so asymmetrical, preventing all terrorist 
attacks is not realistic in the open and free society of the United States, especially when it 
comes to the nation’s train and subway systems. Future attacks may be mitigated, 
however, by relentlessly pursuing those terrorists and their associates when acts are 
perpetrated.    
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VI. RECOVERY  
Due to the unpredictable nature of terrorism and the open nature of train systems, 
a determined terrorist can successfully attack a train system, even with all of the 
aforementioned layers of protection,. Given this fact and the fact that the current trend in 
transportation system attacks appears to be multiple, nearly simultaneous, conventional 
explosions, any adequate strategy to protect a train system from a terror attack needs to 
include a comprehensive evacuation plan.  
This evacuation is designed to lessen the impact of an attack and aid in the 
recovery. For example, terrorists have very successfully targeted mass transportation 
systems around the world. They bombed Madrid, London and Mumbai, as well as others. 
These attacks all incorporated multiple explosives devices that were detonated at 
different times. The terrorists’ plan is to execute a “spectacular” attack and cause as many 
casualties as possible. Transportation counterterrorism experts have said: 
For terrorist organizations seeking to produce mass-casualty attacks, such 
a ‘target-rich environment’ makes rail systems particularly attractive.123 
Whereas it is unclear whether the previous programs would have prevented all or 
some of the previous attacks, preventing all attacks is not definite due to the fluid nature 
of train systems and their vast system of tracks and stations. To save lives and lessen the 
impact of a terrorist attack, a quick evacuation of the entire transportation system is 
necessary in the event that a single or initial explosion or incident has occurred. 
Research has shown that the current New York City subway evacuation plan calls 
for a complete evacuation of the entire subway system in the event of a single explosion. 
It relies, however, on the civilian employees of the Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority (MTA), the train conductors, to pull the train into the next stop and self-
evacuate all passengers without utilizing emergency responders.124 A review of this  
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current plan reveals that it does not utilize the New York City Police Department, Fire 
Department or other emergency workers to assist in the evacuation in a pre-planned 
systematic manner.125 
The current evacuation plan has some serious deficiencies. To begin with, the 
time between the first incident, or a confirmed explosion, and when the evacuation order 
is given is unable to be accurately calculated. This is because it is difficult to judge when 
the MTA will be notified and when they will be able to give the evacuation order.  
For example, on September 11, 2001, the MTA did not shut down the Transit 
System until 10:20 a.m., one hour and thirty-four minutes from when the first plane 
struck the North Tower. 126 Conversely, there is a track record of extremely quick 
notification and response within the NYPD. According to the McKinsey Report on the 
NYPD response to 9/11, it only took one minute from the time the first plane struck the 
North Tower of the World Trade Center until a Level 3 mobilization was called over 
NYPD communications system.127  
The NYC Office of Emergency Management full-scale exercise, conducted on 
August 26, 2007, revealed that all of first responders — whether police officers, 
firefighters or emergency medical technicians — responded directly to the affected area. 
This may be proper in the case of an accident, but in the age of terrorism, this is a serious 
flaw. The exercise involved a secondary device that was discovered during the exercise 
and was rendered safe before detonation. This exercise was under controlled exercise 
conditions and does not adequately reflect the research of past major attacks.  
During the exercise, the NYPD notified the Rail Control Center to implement an 
“emergency shutdown,” but the MTA representative thought they were asking for a  
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“power removal,” which is a distinctly different operation. The NYPD representative was 
calling for an evacuation; instead he received a disconnection of the electrical power to 
the effected area.128  
This exercise gave significant merit to the author’s assertion that the current NYC 
subway system evacuation plan needs to be re-evaluated. The lack of understanding 
between the parties and the subsequent delay may have led to serious consequences, 
especially if this had been an actual attack with near simultaneous explosive devices, 
which experts predict is a likely scenario. 
The exercise also revealed a need for more awareness of a secondary attack from 
arriving pedestrians. A perimeter around Penn Station was not established until fifteen 
minutes after arrival of the first officers. Even then, the perimeter was not adequately 
hardened and pedestrians were able to access areas that were within the security 
perimeter.129       
Due to the nature of terrorist attacks, any comprehensive evacuation plan has to 
include the local or municipal emergency agencies to proactively assist in the evacuation. 
Each municipality should have a comprehensive evacuation plan that includes that city’s, 
state’s or town’s emergency personnel to assist in the evacuation. Police officers, 
firefighters, and emergency medical technicians should all be part of a comprehensive 
evacuation plan that places a priority on quickly evacuating personnel from all trains in 
the system.  
The history of attacks has shown that several devices are usually placed inside the 
trains.  Once the initial explosion has occurred, more explosions often follow. To lessen 
the impact of such an attack, passengers should be quickly evacuated. Since nobody can 
be sure which trains have explosive devices and which do not, all trains should be 
evacuated quickly. 
The emergency personnel can assist in the evacuation by reporting to 
predetermined locations, such as train stations, to help the transit employees safely 
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evacuate the passengers. The police officers on patrol, the firefighters on the fire truck 
and the emergency medical services technicians on their ambulance can all respond to 
pre-designated locations in their area of responsibility. This of course would be 
superseded by the need for assistance from the initial blast site, but in large cities, such as 
New York, miles can separate train locations from one another. Those emergency 
workers not near the initial incident site would be better served by quickly evacuating 
passengers from a train or bus that may be armed with an explosive device.      
Once the entire system has been evacuated, properly trained explosive experts can 
mitigate any remaining devices. This quick evacuation is sure to save lives and to instill 
confidence in the passengers that their municipality is taking every effort to protect them 
from the terrorists. 
A proper evacuation is an important part of this strategy. Prevention involves not 
only completely interrupting a terrorist plot, but also preventing “terrorists from 
achieving the goals their attacks are meant to accomplish.”130 By limiting the 
effectiveness of an attack through a successful evacuation, the enormous amount of fear 
that the terrorists wish to create, would be significantly reduced.  
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VII. STRATEGIC CONCLUSIONS  
It is quite obvious from the research that the United States is faced with the fact 
that international terrorists want to launch more attacks in the United States. The 
terrorists are prone to attacking the mass transit system, since that tactic has worked very 
successfully on other transportation systems around the world. 
Protecting the subway and train systems in the United States is an incredibly 
difficult task. This is evident by statements from transportation security experts: 
Protecting the vast transit network of the United States will clearly not be 
an easy task.131 
Even Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff has acknowledged that the 
federal government is relying heavily on “state and locals” to do the job.132  
This thesis has provided a realistic Compstat counterterrorism strategy for local 
police departments to follow in an effort to prevent a devastating attack on a train or 
subway system in the United States. No city or state agency can have a fully risk-free 
mass transit system and remain functional, due to the open and fluid nature of these 
systems.  
It is incumbent upon the United States to stop taking the approach that we are 
fighting a “war” on terrorism domestically and that we can prevent every single terrorist 
attack. That is simply not the case. The purported “war” on crime certainly did not 
prevent every single incident of criminal activity from taking place. What can be done is 
to take a realistic, proven, crime-fighting approach to the threat of a terrorist attack, 
specifically against the train and subway systems. This crime-fighting strategic approach 
is appropriate because terrorists are, after all, criminals.133 The fact that terrorism is a 
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crime makes it susceptible to a crime prevention strategy.134 Under this premise, proper 
utilization of local police resources and adaptation of proven law enforcement techniques 
can reduce the threat of terrorism.  
In addition to this preventative strategy, a comprehensive and quick evacuation 
plan has proven to be necessary by examining the deficiencies of the current evacuation 
plan, made evident in the full-scale exercise conducted. By taking this approach, the 
author believes the threat and consequences of an attack can be reduced to an acceptable 
level, one that the passengers of America’s trains and subways can tolerate as they 
tolerate the threat of crime.  
Research has shown that the CompStat process has been successful in reducing 
crime to record low numbers in New York. Cities from all over the country have copied 
the NYPD’s crime-fighting approach. This has led to dramatic decreases in crime in cities 
all over the country. 
Research has also shown that since there is a strong crime–terrorism nexus, the 
components of a successful CompStat strategy directly apply to a counterterrorism 
strategy.   
The hypothesis put forth in this thesis is that a new strategy can reduce the threat 
of a terrorist attack on the train and subway systems of America. The proposed strategy is 
devised from combing current NYPD CompStat and counterterrorism programs. Another 
concept in this thesis is that the new CompStat counterterrorism strategy could be 
replicated across the country, similar to the spread of the crime fighting CompStat 
strategy. In support of the apparent success of the NYPD’s counterterrorism initiatives, 
homeland security experts have said that the NYPD, under the leadership of 
Commissioner Raymond Kelly, has created the least friendly environment for terrorists in 
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the country.135 These same homeland security experts agree with this research, in that it 
would be beneficial to apply a CompStat strategy to combating terrorism: 
Most vitally, the theory of order maintenance commonly called "broken 
windows," which police in New York City have used so successfully in the 
war on crime, can be adapted for the war on terror.136 
Not only experts have made this assertion. Heather MacDonald, of the Manhattan 
Institute, has written that Compstat is “tailor-made for combating terrorism.” 137 She further 
states: 
The FBI’s anti-terrorism efforts should be Compstated in every city where the 
bureau operates.138 
The Director of the Homeland Security Management Institute at Long Island 
University also agrees that CompStat could apply to combating terrorism: 
The same strengths that make Compstat work to reduce crime or to manage 
an entire city can easily be brought to bear on the threat of terrorism, with the 
same potential for success.139 
While all of the aspects of this theory are yet to be realized, a major point of this 
thesis has been validated. The speculation that other major train systems will copy a 
successful NYPD strategy has been confirmed. The nation’s most extensive railroad has 
started to copy the NYPD’s Subway Counterterrorism programs. Amtrak announced on 
February 18, 2008, that it will implement security changes: 
Amtrak will start randomly screening passengers’ carry-on bags this week 
in a new security push that includes officers with automatic weapons and 
bomb-sniffing dogs patrolling platforms and trains.140 
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Amtrak’s vice president for security strategy and special operations, Bill Rooney, 
admitted that the new procedures draw heavily on measures being used in the New York 
City subways.141 
Implementation of the Counterterrorism CompStat strategy is worth the effort if it 
can deter or even alter the plans of the terrorists. That alone will lessen the attack, and 
because the stakes are so high, lives will be saved. Transportation Security experts agree 
that: 
Even if security measures prevent only the largest-scale attacks, they 
could significantly reduce the human costs associated with this threat. 
Given recent large-scale attacks on rail systems in Madrid, London, and 
Mumbai, coupled with the desire of contemporary terrorist groups, such as 
al Qaeda, to produce mass-casualty events, the importance of preventing 
these macroterrorist events takes on added magnitude.142 
The strategic importance of this CompStat approach to combating the threat of 
terrorism in the train and subway systems across the nation is that it can reduce the 
greatest weapon of the terrorists: fear. Local law enforcement was able to garner the 
knowledge and skill to reduce the fear of crime when it was skyrocketing across the 
country. They now have the same ability to reduce, to a similar level, the fear associated 
with domestic terrorism.  
The strategy also prevents a paralyzing economic response to the constant threat 
of an attack. By providing a realistic strategic vision on how to properly combat 
terrorism, using proven law enforcement techniques, excessive expenditures of economic 
resources can be prevented. Unrealistic and costly ideas — such as searching every 
person and bag before it enters the train and subway systems, and retrofitting every train 
car to be more blast resilient — can be avoided. When crime was rising and perceived to 
be out of control, the NYPD and other police departments did not spend billions of  
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dollars to place a police officer or video camera on every corner. Instead, they relied on a 
CompStat strategy to reduce crime. It worked, and now we must apply a similar strategy 
to combat terrorism.    
Another important concept in this thesis is the assurance that law enforcement is 
up to the task. Local law enforcement reduced crime across the United States, and can do 
the same to the threat of terrorism. This strategy would use the same resources that 
reduced crime across the country and would provide a realistic and sustainable approach 
to redirect these resources to combat the threat of terrorism. Just as the crime-fighting 
CompStat system has proven malleable enough to apply to both large metropolitan cities 
and small towns, the CompStat counterterrorism approach is applicable to all of the train 
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